At $3 per person, a six-person Founding team creates an $18 monthly invoice. That number raises an uncomfortable question for the company building the software: why not charge more?
For a 20-person company, the same price creates a $60 monthly bill. A conventional software growth plan might treat the remaining room in that budget as revenue waiting to be captured through a higher tier, another product, an add-on, or a longer contract.
Kordano Time starts with a different target. We want to minimize what a customer must spend to maintain a useful time record and review process, while charging enough to keep the product supportable.
That does not make Kordano “cheap.” Cheap can mean careless, disposable, or unable to fund the work behind the product. Kordano Time costs less because customer cost is a design constraint in the business model.
I started this article with the word greed. It was easy, and it was wrong. The more useful distinction was the number each business treats as success.
Maximization is not another word for greed
In economics, profit maximization has a precise meaning. A firm chooses the level of output where the additional revenue from one more unit equals the additional cost of producing it. OpenStax explains the decision boundary and the separate question of whether the firm can cover its costs.
Software does not behave exactly like a textbook market, but the basic question survives: what is the company trying to increase?
Many subscription businesses track average revenue per account, net revenue retention, seat expansion, upgrade rates, cross-sell, and add-on adoption. Those are sensible measures for a company trying to grow revenue from customers it already has. If a team receives more value and willingly buys more, both sides can win.
The problem begins when the growth measure becomes the product brief. A useful function may sit one tier higher because the upgrade improves revenue. A simple workflow may become several products because cross-selling looks better in an investor report. A monthly customer may be pushed toward a yearly commitment because predictable revenue is valuable to the seller.
None of that proves the product is bad. It does show who benefits first when the bill grows.
The companies that say expansion out loud
The revealing pages were not product homepages. They were investor filings, where seat expansion, cross-sell, and higher spend are written without euphemism.
Here is how five large software companies describe growth from existing customers in their own materials:
| Company | What the company reports | What it means for the model |
|---|---|---|
| monday.com | Its 2025 annual report identifies increased seat penetration, multi-product adoption, and AI adoption as growth drivers. | More people and more products inside an existing account can increase revenue. |
| Atlassian | Its Q2 FY2026 shareholder letter attributes cloud growth to paid-seat expansion, cross-sell, higher average revenue per user, and upgrades. | Growth is partly measured by broader use and higher spend inside the customer base. |
| Asana | Its fiscal 2026 annual filing describes a sales motion focused on “maximizing account expansion.” | The account is expected to become more valuable to the provider after entry. |
| HubSpot | Its 2025 annual filing tracks average subscription revenue per customer and net revenue retention as key business measures. | Revenue retained and expanded within current customers matters alongside new sales. |
| Box | Its fiscal 2025 annual filing connects revenue with customer count, seats, price, bundled plans, add-ons, and contract value. | Seat growth and broader packaging can raise the value of an existing contract. |
This is not a list of villains. These companies are telling investors how their businesses grow, which is exactly what public companies are expected to do. Some customers need enterprise administration, advanced security, several connected products, and dedicated service. Those capabilities cost money to build and operate.
Still, the filings reveal the optimization target. I went looking for a customer-cost measure beside the expansion measures. None of these five filings reports “how little a customer had to spend” as a success metric.
That missing number is the opening for a different model.
What the business model rewards becomes a product decision
Pricing is often discussed as if someone develops a finished product and attaches a number at the end. In practice, the revenue model reaches backward into product design.
| Decision | Expansion-led SaaS | Unsustainable cheap software | Customer-cost minimization |
|---|---|---|---|
| Main success signal | More revenue, seats, products, or usage per account | More signups at almost any price | A useful customer outcome at the lowest supportable total cost |
| Packaging pressure | Create upgrade paths, bundles, add-ons, and wider account adoption | Promise too much and defer hard costs | Keep scope deliberate and make every paid boundary explainable |
| Contract pressure | Prefer larger or longer commitments when they improve predictability | Use a low price without proving continuity | Let the stated price and term stand on their own |
| Product risk | Complexity can grow because each new layer creates expansion revenue | Support, reliability, or development may collapse | Important work may be omitted if prioritization becomes too strict |
| Healthy version | Extra spend funds extra value the buyer can verify | A small product serves a narrow job profitably | The provider covers its costs while leaving more money with the customer |
This is why I no longer treat a low entry price as proof of customer alignment. It can be the first step in an expansion funnel. A $3 starting price means very little if a normal review later requires a $9 tier, a connector fee, a storage charge, and an annual contract.
The opposite is also true. A higher price is not evidence of exploitation when it pays for a costly capability the customer actually needs.
The test is whether the pricing boundary follows real value and real operating cost, or whether the product has been divided mainly to create another reason to upgrade.
The Optimization Target Map
Four targets are commonly mixed together in software pricing conversations:
| Target | The question behind it | Who benefits when it improves? |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue per account | How can this customer spend more with us? | Primarily the provider, unless the added spend buys equal or greater value |
| Growth or valuation | How can the company become larger or more valuable faster? | Owners and investors first, with possible benefits to customers through investment |
| Provider sustainability | Can the company fund infrastructure, security, support, and continued development? | Both sides, because an unsupported product is a customer risk |
| Customer total cost | How little can the customer spend and still complete the job properly? | The customer first, with provider discipline as the operating consequence |
Kordano does not reject profit. A product that cannot pay for its own operation eventually fails the people relying on it. Kordano puts provider sustainability and customer total cost together, then treats revenue expansion as a result that must be justified rather than the default target.
I think a product company should be able to explain who benefits when the bill grows.
What minimization means at Kordano Time
Customer-cost minimization begins by publishing the whole commercial path, including the parts that are less attractive than the opening number.
| Team | Current Kordano price | Founding status | What happens later |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fewer than 6 people | $4 per person per month | Early Access, not a Founding 25 spot | No Founding discount; future terms are not promised here |
| 6 or more people, while spots remain | $3 per person per month | One of 25 qualifying companies | Price is locked for 24 months |
| Founding company after 24 months | $4 per person per month | Permanent 20% discount from the $5 public price | The Founding price remains $4 while the public price is $5 |
| New company after all Founding spots are taken | $5 per person per month | No Founding spot | Public pricing |
Billing is month to month. No yearly contract is required. The Founding limit means 25 qualifying companies, not 25 individual users, and teams must have at least 6 people to qualify. Access is planned to begin on December 1, 2026.
The $3 price is not permanent public pricing. It is a special 24-month Founding price. We are saying that plainly because minimization without transparent conditions is only a marketing claim.
For a qualifying 20-person company, the first 24 months cost $60 per month. Afterward, that company pays $80 per month at the Founding rate. A new 20-person customer at the public rate would pay $100.
That difference is deliberate. When we make a pricing decision, the effect on customer cost comes before the opportunity to increase average revenue per account.
It does not mean every future capability can be promised inside every price forever. It means any paid boundary should survive a simple question: does it reflect additional cost or additional customer value, or does it exist mainly because the business wants a larger bill?
Low price has to be designed in
There are useful models outside workforce software.
IKEA describes low price as one of the inputs to product design, considered alongside function, form, quality, and sustainability. The price constraint appears at the beginning, not as a discount after the object has been designed.
Costco explains its lower-price model through limited selection, purchasing volume, rapid inventory turnover, and operating efficiency. Lower margins work because the operating system is built around them.
Basecamp argues for sustainable profit as a source of independence and long-term stability. Its example matters because minimization is not the same as refusing to earn money. A customer does not benefit when a provider prices itself out of existence.
The software translation is straightforward:
- Start with the price constraint before deciding how many packages to create.
- Keep the main job understandable instead of using feature volume as a value signal.
- Do not make the customer buy back ordinary work through a trail of extras.
- Avoid a long commitment when the product can stand on monthly renewal.
- Fund the unglamorous work that keeps the service usable.
Building a time product under a low seat price changes the feature question. The first question becomes, “Does this help a manager complete a real review?” It is not, “Does this give us another reason to create a tier?”
That does not guarantee every product decision will be correct. It makes the constraint visible enough for customers to challenge us when it is not.
The sustainability floor
Low price without a sustainability floor is not generous. It is deferred failure.
Software has continuing costs: infrastructure, security work, support, maintenance, product development, data handling, and the people responsible when something breaks. A company that ignores those costs may keep a tiny invoice for a while, then reduce service, stop improving the product, impose a sudden increase, or disappear.
Kordano Time is also in Early Access. It does not have the operating history of the large companies named above, and we should not pretend otherwise. The lower price is a statement about the business model, not proof that every part of the product has already earned trust.
Trust has to be earned through clear terms, a product that performs the stated job, honest boundaries around what is live, and a business that can continue supporting customers.
A current software study illustrates why both sides of the constraint matter. Simon-Kucher surveyed 516 software executives and 161 software buyers in 2025. Executives named usage, upselling, pricing changes, and cross-selling among their growth priorities. Buyers across roles reported frustration when pricing was opaque, unpredictable, or rigid.
It is a small buyer sample, so it should not be treated as the whole market. It does capture the tension: providers want expansion, while buyers want to know and control the bill.
Customer-cost minimization accepts that tension and chooses a side when the two goals conflict. The customer should be able to predict the cost before the provider tries to increase it.
The Low Price Is Real Test
A buyer does not need to accept any provider’s philosophy on faith. Five questions expose whether a low price is an operating constraint, a temporary acquisition offer, or the entrance to a larger bill.
1. What is the exact term?
Ask whether the displayed price requires annual prepayment, a minimum seat count, or a contract. Kordano’s $3 Founding price requires a qualifying team of 6 or more, but billing remains month to month and no yearly contract is required.
2. What is the later price?
Ask for the number after the promotion, not only the discount language. Kordano’s $3 Founding price lasts 24 months. It then becomes $4 per person per month, while the public price is $5.
3. What triggers a forced upgrade?
List the work your team must complete, then identify the plan containing each part. A low entry tier is not a low-cost model when ordinary work requires the next tier. The real cost of time-tracking software shows how to combine the seat, add-on, administration, unused-license, and contract layers.
4. Which operating costs are excluded?
Check implementation, support, connectors, storage, migration, and internal review time. For Founding 25 customers, Kordano migration is free, unlimited, human-assisted, and available from any product. A human member of the Kordano team will help move projects, users, work history, and other available information using a CSV export or secure account access.
Use the 15 questions to ask before buying time-tracking software to test the costs and conditions beyond the headline.
5. Can the customer leave with usable data?
A low bill does not compensate for trapped records. Ask for the export, deletion, notice, and renewal terms before joining. Kordano is still in Early Access, so product behavior that has not been confirmed should remain marked as needing proof. The workforce data control checklist gives you the full exit test.
Transparent pricing is not a favor. In TrustRadius’s 2025 survey of 2,058 verified technology buyers, the availability of transparent pricing was the top change buyers wanted. A serious product should be able to state the price, the conditions, and the later number before asking for a call.
A smaller invoice should still buy a serious product
Kordano Time costs less because the business is being built around a minimization target. The target is not the smallest possible price under every condition. It is the lowest supportable total cost for the customer.
That requires two promises at once: do not build cheaply, and do not treat every piece of customer value as an expansion opportunity.
If a 20-person ecommerce operations team had $100 a month for time software, a $60 Kordano Founding bill would leave $40 with the business. The constraint is to make that $60 worth renewing without inventing another charge.
The Founding price is $3 per person per month for qualifying teams of 6 or more, billed month to month for the first 24 months. After that, Founding members pay $4. Teams under 6 enter at $4 and do not receive a Founding spot.
Those are not the terms of software trying to be cheap. They are the terms of a company choosing which number it wants to minimize.
Companies with teams of 6 or more can lock $3 per person per month for 24 months.
Claim your spot
Haris Ali D. is the Founder of Kordano, a workforce operating system for modern teams. He focuses on building practical tools for time tracking, attendance, productivity visibility, and team operations.
He also brings experience in branding, digital strategy, and software development through FullStop, a company he co-founded in 2012.